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This chapter contends that there is an overemphasis in the academic literature on the 
effect the Iranian Revolution had on shifting the dynamics of contentious politics in 
Bahrain. This has created a discourse in which belligerents are framed according to the 
contemporary transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, reifying a narrative that can 
contribute to the perpetuation of anti-Shi‘a and anti-Baḥārna1 prejudice. Using a closer 
reading of historical and modern sources, this paper argues that it was not solely the 
Islamic Revolution, nor the discovery of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, 
that shifted government policy towards Bahrain’s Shi‘a. Instead, ethno-religious 
discrimination is rooted in the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest, which was ossified by 
colonial intervention, but reinvigorated by Bahrain’s Independence, growing Saudi 
influence, the Iran-Iraq war, and a historically-rooted Al Khalifa antipathy towards the 
indigenous population. Thus, changes in the modalities of repression are better 
explained by a multitude of interacting factors, rather than the totalising influence of 
Iran.  
In the writing of history, certain tropes can attract a certain amount of 
importance, becoming uncritically accepted and embedded in the abridged histories or 
summaries of specific nations or places. For Bahrain, the Iranian Revolution and the 
attempted coup of 1981 by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) have 
become such tropes, and are often referred to as turning points in Bahrain’s history of 
contentious politics. This has been exacerbated by Bahrain’s limited sovereignty and 
reliance on foreign protectors, which have encouraged analyses of the role of 
transnational forces and links. Indeed, scholars, academics, and commentators, and I 
include myself among them, repeat the Islamic Revolution ad nauseum when 
recounting notable incidents of Bahrain's history. Arguably such a trend reflects what 
Edward Said noted was a superficial reporting of Iran, conducted by ‘individuals 
connected to corporate or quasi-governmental institutions, or Middle Easterners known 
for their essentially antagonistic positions on the Iranian Revolution’.2 This coverage of 
the revolution and its immediate aftermath perhaps better reflect hurt sensibilities 
regarding the deposing of the US-backed shah, rather than the complexities of the 
regional situation.  
Yet revisionism on this issue should be prompted, not simply by the topic of this 
collection, which asks, among other things, how historical events and transnational 
dynamics have shaped communal and ideological struggles within the Gulf, but also in 
consideration of contemporary facts. Following extensive scrutiny of the recent unrest 
by academics, NGOs, human rights organizations and social and traditional media, the 
Bahraini government’s rhetoric about the Iranian sponsorship of the 2011 Uprising has 
been thrown into serious doubt. It is generally accepted that despite the Government of 
Bahrain’s attempts to claim Iranian involvement behind the pro-democracy movement 
of 20113, no substantive evidence has been found.4  On the contrary, analyses have 
shown that the government of Bahrain has employed PR companies to deliberately 
exaggerate the claim of Iranian involvement.5 Indeed, with the Government of Bahrain 
known to have deliberately instrumentalised sectarian relations as a divide and rule 
strategy in the recent Uprising6, the discrediting of attempts to invoke Iranian-backing 
should prompt a re-evaluation of an often uncritically embraced assumption of Iranian 
agency in Bahraini politics throughout the early 1980s.  Could it be that that the 1979 
Revolution as-a-turning-point discourse is also a specious foundation on which current 
denouncements of the opposition lie? Has the emphasis in both media discourse and 
history itself come to represent an inaccurate and exaggerated distal shift in Bahrain’s 
history? By reviewing the historical record, I argue that there were other significant, but 
poorly understood, factors during the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in both the 
increasing oppression of the ‘religious’ and non-religious opposition. Furthermore, the 
weight given to the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain outweighs its significance as the 
proximate cause in altering the modalities of repression and the treatment of Shi‘a in 
Bahrain. Placing the cart before the horse is both inaccurate and damaging. Not only 
does it misplace causality for ideological reasons, but it has averted attention from 
exploring other important factors, such as a fundamentally discriminatory political 
system.  
 
  
Metanarrative of the Revolution as turning-point discourse 
 
The Iranian Revolution as a turning point in Bahraini politics narratives tend to abrogate 
local agency or more complex explanations in favour of a simplified Iran-as-a-
bogeyman analysis. As a result, it has become a recurring theme within national security 
rhetoric in Bahrain aimed at legitimising the persecution of the country's Shiʿa 
population by emphasising their disputed allegiance to Bahrain. It has also served to 
support the hegemonic status quo by reinforcing the notion that the Government’s 
oppression of the opposition is done so in order to maintain stability, plurality and 
sovereignty in the wake of an enduring transnational theocratic threat.7  Over 
emphasising the importance of the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain's history therefore 
underpins government strategies, processes, and actions that serve to disproportionally 
criminalise or ‘securitise’ (to use the fashionable nomenclature) the Shi‘a members of 
society, while obscuring the roots of this discrimination.  This, in turn, assists in the 
attribution of ‘inferiority and/or radical alienness’ of the Shi‘a as Other, or outgroup,8 
thereby perpetuating cycles of discrimination. Not only is this ‘othering’ regionally 
embedded, but it is also undoubtedly aggravated by Western hostility towards Iran 
which, as Shireen Hunter argues, has played a major role in causing people to overlook 
atrocities and injustices committed against Shi‘a populations across the globe.9 To be 
clear, there is a difference between arguments of the impact of the Iranian Revolution in 
Bahrain, and the manner in which the Revolution was instrumentalised as a strategy of 
control.  Indeed, it is certainly true that Bahrain’s Rulers have invoked the Revolution 
‘to win the reflexive support of ordinary Sunnis and to diffuse citizen pressure for a 
political opening’.10 This argument, however, is different from overstating the actual 
effects on the beliefs of Bahrainis. 
The turning-point narrative is pervasive in academic, policy, media and legal 
literature on Bahrain. In general, the perception of the post-1979 Iranian Government as 
a rogue actor in the international system, along with its well-publicised desire to 
‘export’ the revolution, has facilitated the analysis of it as a causal fulcrum and arch-
villain in regional politics. This perception has been augmented since the invasion of 
Iraq and subsequent civil war in 2003, and popularised more recently by scholars such 
as Vali Nasr, who repeatedly refers the Revolution as a Shia ‘awakening’. In The Shia 
Revival, Nasr writes ‘The revolution also awakened the Shia. They became bolder in 
their demands for rights and representation, secure in the belief that Khomeini would 
support them and that they had a model for political activism which would succeed in 
challenging authority’.11 Nowadays, it is difficult to read the historical context of any 
piece on Bahrain without coming across the coup attempt or the Iranian Revolution as a 
variable in shifting the modality of Shi‘a mobilization or threat perception12. This 
occurs across disciplines, from international relations to political science, with various 
levels of reductionism. Maximillian Terhalle sees the Iranian Revolution as the starting 
point of ‘sectarianism’ as a ruling strategy: ‘The government has applied sectarianism as 
one of the means to rule the country since 1979…however, in the years before the 
revolution in Iran, the rulers had not taken advantage of sectarian divisions’.13 Afshin 
Shahi infers a more ubiquitous appeal of the revolution to all Shi‘a, irrespective of 
marjaʿ taqlīdī (source to imitate and/or follow): ‘The wind of [the] Iranian revolution 
was now on [sic] the air in every country in the Middle East. Bahrain and Iraq with 
substantial Shiite majorities were particularly threatened by the ideas from across the 
border, which at any time could trigger a Shiite insurrection’.14 In other instances, 
Bahraini support for the revolution is unsubstantiated and vague, with little specification 
given about the extent of its appeal. For example, Jeremy Jones and Nichoas Ridout 
note that the ‘Bahrain Shi‘a had demonstrated in support of the Iranian Revolution in 
February 1979 and again in August’.15 Mehran Kamrava singles out the Iranian 
Revolution as a creator of ‘chaos’: ‘The rulers of these countries see these uprisings as 
their most serious crises since the Iranian revolution threw the region into chaos in the 
early 1980s’.16 David Commins notes in his history of the Gulf States that, ‘quite 
simply, the Iranian Revolution threatened the political survival of the Gulf States’.17 
Ma'oz suggests that the Islamic Revolution 'provided Bahrain’s Shi’i majority with a 
model of a state that would emancipate them and represent their identity'. 18  Other 
scholars, such as Hasan al Hasan, have explored in depth the extent to which the IFLB 
were backed by Iran, or Iranian elements, thereby reifying this discourse while 
simultaneously highlighting that the Bahraini government have failed to substantiate the 
evidence19.   
This narrative is also reflected in numerous policy documents or reports by 
various Think Tanks. In a 2016 report for the Atlantic Council, Bilal Saab states that the 
Iranian Revolution was the catalyst for the creation of communal tensions: ' Bahrainis 
are repulsed by the thought and reject the notion of sectarian division in the country, 
citing decades of communal peace and coexistence (until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in 
Iran)'. International Crisis Group, reporting an interview with the Bahraini activist 
Ibrahim Sharif, argued that 'prior to 1979 the government did not pursue a specifically 
sectarian agenda, since it viewed the most serious threat as emanating from leftist 
organisations'.20 Among these analyses there tends to be, with varying levels of nuance, 
assertion, allusion, or assumption, that the Islamic Revolution either galvanized or 
inspired the Bahraini Shiʿa, or formed the key basis for their ethnoreligious and 
sectarian persecution. In various iterations, numerous scholars and commentators have 
contributed to the emergence of a totalising narrative, arguing that the revolution altered 
threat perceptions, injected religion into politics, or deeply transformed Bahraini 
society. With few exceptions21, the transnational threat of the Shi‘a and the Iranian 
Revolution as a turning point has become a metanarrative in discussions of Bahrain, 
forming an uncritically embraced normative trope that can serve to justify suspicion 
towards the country’s Shi‘a. From discussion of the regime’s threat perception to an 
assumed belief in Shi‘a unity, discourses have approached the Revolution as totalising 
in its impact, both from below and above. While the long-standing persecution of the 
Shi‘a in Bahrain is generally acknowledged by most academics, the emphasis on the 
Iranian Revolution as a key moment in Bahrain’s history is a somewhat dissonant 
element that sits incongruously within broader analyses.  
 
 
Revisiting the Revolution 
 
In many cases, it has become a truism that the unrest and demonstrations that occurred 
in Bahrain in 1979 and 1980 were all related to the Iranian Uprising. However, claims 
of causality between the Iranian Revolution and unrest in Bahrain are often 
contradictory, unsubstantiated or lack nuance. Gregory Gause noted that after the 
Iranian Revolution, ‘Unrest occurred in Bahrain, the only Gulf shaykhdom with a Shi’i 
majority, in August 1979…’22  Imad Salamey and Zanoubia Othman wrote, ‘the appeal 
of Khomeini’s revolution mustered popular support among the Shi‘a in Lebanon, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Bahrain….’.23 It is notable that the affect in Bahrain did not resemble, for 
example, the Qatif Uprising in Saudi Arabia.24 There is some discord here though. As 
Laurence Louer notes, Bahrain is an exception in the Gulf, mostly because the Shi’a are 
mainly concerned with political participation and democratization.25 Similarly, Amelia 
Ilsa Schumacher notes that Iranian attempts to send emissaries to Bahrain following the 
revolution were largely ineffective due to the fact that there was no unifying ‘Shi‘a 
brotherhood’ in Bahrain, and that reasons Shi‘a dissatisfaction with the Al Khalifa 
government did not translate into a willingness to welcome or support the Revolution.26   
With this incongruity in mind, recently released historical documents show that 
the impact of the Iranian Revolution was, at best, ambivalent.  Harold Walker, the UK 
Ambassador to Bahrain, who was stationed in Bahrain during 1979 and frequently in 
touch with the security services, noted that, 'Since the Iran/Iraq conflict began, there 
have, as you know, been virtually no visible signs of support among the Bahraini Shiʿa 
for the Imam Khomeini’.27 As such, in 1980, the Bahraini authorities predicted a 
peaceful Ashura commemoration. Walker also wrote in November 1980: ‘no necessary 
reason why the Ashura celebrations should lead to political disturbances any more than 
they have over the last decade’. The relative quiet actually surprised Walker, prompting 
him to bring it up with the then ruler, Shaykh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa. In October 
1980, Harold Walker explicitly discussed why ‘the Shi‘i villages had done no protesting 
or demonstrating in favour of Khomeini’. Shaykh’s Isa’s response was that the ‘thorn 
was broken’, and that knowledge was spreading in Bahrain that life in Iran was not a 
‘bed of roses’.28  It is perhaps unusual then that Harold Walker, the UK Ambassador to 
Bahrain during the Revolution noted in a 2011 blog post for the Conservative Middle 
East Council: 'Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the impact of Iran has been the single 
most important factor in fragmenting Bahraini society and injecting religion into 
opposition politics '.29   
Of course it is important to note that the Iranian Revolution had important 
resonance in Bahrain30, yet this impact was far from universal, and certainly more 
nuanced than a general assertion of support for revolutionary Iran. Sophia Pandya 
argues that Bahriani women revealed how many sought inspiration from new, 
contemporary Iranian clerics, (although this still does equate to demanding a 
revolution).31 . Walker noted that the revolution had given the Shia a ‘psychological 
boost’, and encouraged some to press a list for twelve demands, that included asking for 
some form of Islamic governance, to saying music should not be taught in schools. The 
government’s response was to allow the Shi‘a to ‘blow off steam’, and a number of 
demonstrations were held in August 1979.32 Ultimately though, these demands were not 
dissimilar from those advocated by the Shia bloc during Bahrain’s short-lived National 
Assembly from 1973-75.  
 Yet there is also evidence to suggest it was the Bahraini government’s response 
to demonstrations relating to the Iran/Iraq war that had more immediate consequences in 
terms of unrest in Bahrain around the time of the Iranian Revolution. One such 
demonstration occurred on 24 April 1980, at a protest of Iraq’s execution of the cleric 
Mohammed Baqr al-Sadir. After securing permission from the authorities, a few 
thousand people marched in protest at the killing. Sixty-four people were arrested, 
including Jamal Ali Muhsin Al Ali, a young Bahraini, who authorities accused of 
attacking and wounding two Bahraini Army Intelligence officers in the suq33.  Ali was 
tortured to death in police custody on May 10th 1980 and his ‘well photographed 
wounds inflicted by the Bahraini Police’ made him, according to one British official, the 
‘first Bahraini Shi‘a martyr’.34 This police violence was exploited by Hadi al-Mudarrasi, 
a cleric living in exile in Iran and who was argued to be the key link behind Iranian-led 
insurrection in Bahrain. More demonstrations occurred on the 18th and 19th June, when 
al-Mudarrasi called on Bahrainis to mark Arba‘īn, the forty-day anniversary of Jamal’s 
death. It is perhaps unsurprising that the well photographed torture marks of Jamal 
should elicit an angry public response, especially considering that he was, according to 
FCO documents, innocent.35 Even so, according to FCO documents, while 1,000 
gathered, it was peaceful apart from tyre burning.  Later on, the torture and killing of 
Mohammad Hassan Madan in a Bahraini prison on February 14 1981, resulted in three 
days of protests, which resulted in another death, this time of a young boy called Adil 
Khoki.36 Indeed, it was only after 1975 that death by torture in Bahrain’s prisons, which 
had not been reported between the 1920s and the 1970s, became more prevalent. 
Between 1976 and 1986, eight people died in police custody, and Amnesty International 
and the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group reported that at least six of those 
were believed to be because of torture.37 In this regard, the rise in police brutality, the 
reasons for which shall be discussed later, was also an important factor in local 
demonstrations, yet these are rarely elaborated upon.  
 
 
Transnational narratives versus longstanding discrimination 
 
In addition to exaggerating the impact of the Revolution’s appeal, the salience of the 
Iranian Revolution as a turning-point discourse is problematic as it positions the Shi‘a 
as a security threat, implying that they are somehow agents of their own persecution.  
This totalizing narrative reflects the contemporary politicisation of Shia/Sunni sectarian 
relations, and detracts the focus from a fundamentally oppressive political system that 
has been documented since, at least, the Al Khalifa conquest of the Bahrain islands. 
Because of the often ill-defined nature of the term ‘sectarianism’, there has been a 
tendency to parse it off from other explanatory variables, resulting in a sui generis 
approach that ignores fundamental aspects of intersecting discrimination, culture and 
social conditions38. McVeigh argues that sectarianism has been undertheorised and 
actually constitutes a form of racism.39 Fanar Haddad echoes this sentiment, noting that 
academic theorising of race relations is fare more nuanced than the often crude 
application of ‘sectarianism’.4041 In the case of Bahrain, ethno-religious discrimination 
of a former serf/slave population, one in which specific members of the Shi‘i 
community can still also achieve positions of high office, has taken on the rigidity of 
institutional discrimination. It is important to question to what extent this ethno-
religious discrimination and tribal-familial exclusivity among the ruling elite informs 
state violence, and how long it has lasted, in order to better counter the ‘turning-point’ 
discourse.   Indeed, the historical record suggests that it was in times of increasing 
persecution in Bahrain that inhabitants sought protection, rather than passively adopting 
exogenous beliefs based on ideology alone. In 1921, Major Clive Daly, the British 
Political Agent in Bahrain, stated that he was often asked, ‘Why do you not remove 
British protection then we would at least have the redress usually resorted to by Arabs. 
We should appeal to another Arab ruler to take over our country and treat us better’. 42 
 Narratives that reflect a transnational determinism, that is, a tendency to portray 
major variables as emanating from external sources, can often be rooted in the political 
ideology of a multitude of prisms, from neo-imperialism itself, to postcolonial 
discourses and Arab Nationalism. The most obvious example is the aforementioned 
transatlantic antipathy towards Iran, a result of the humiliation faced by Britain and the 
US following the ejecting of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the overthrow of the 
Shah respectively. Yet part of the problem in studying Bahrain, perhaps, also lies in the 
application of what has become a Eurocentric phenomenon of modernity to analysis- 
one, in which the creation of the state and its institutions through colonialism is 
somehow the subject of focus, and one that can result in total disjuncture between a 
previous era and the ‘modern’.43  In this analysis, concepts such as sectarianism 
somehow become a neatly packaged and temporally limited product of modernity. For 
example, it is contentious to argue that “the ‘vertical segmentation’ in Bahraini politics 
was not an age-old form of political mobilization, but a modernist one whose roots were 
sculpted during the period of British divided and contested rule in 1900–1923, and in 
the colonial ethnosectarian gaze that accompanied it”. 44 This argument places the roots 
of sectarian tensions at the British administration, reflecting underlying tones of Arab 
Nationalism, whose central tenets rallied against imperialism.  Certainly, post-
Orientalist analysis and post-colonial critique have used it to buttress the anti-imperial 
tenets of Arab Nationalism which sought to define sectarian antipathy not only as 
deviant, but also as a colonial construct45. While there is clearly truth in this, it does not 
make it wholly accurate, and such arguments run the risk of creating the illusion of a 
pre-imperial utopia.  
Despite the analytical richness of such writings, it leads to arguments that again, 
seek to explain phenomena such as sectarian tensions as being primarily or solely the 
work of external agency, beginning at a specific point. This results in the problem of 
potentially attributing subaltern victimhood to those who may be active agents in a 
discriminatory apparatus. Such arguments run the risk of ignoring the colonising agency 
or prejudices of local actors, or undermining the significance of local social, political or 
cultural contexts that are capable themselves of mobilization, discrimination, and 
prejudice. In recent years this has been abetted, for example, by King Abdullah of 
Jordan, whose discourse of a rising Shi‘i Crescent has become a ‘self-‘fulfilling 
prophecy’, reflecting not necessarily the threat by ‘the Shi‘a’, but that the ‘Arab world 
has identified the region’s Shi‘i communities as threats to their authority’.46 While we 
should not be dismissive of any of these variables, there is a danger in Bahrain that they 
feed into a simplified binary of contemporary identity politics, where Shia/Sunni 
tensions are structured according to Western security strategy, and are therefore  
‘blamed’ specifically on Shi‘i ‘victories and Persian/Iranian aggrandizement. For this 
reason, any analysis must not preclude consideration of the underlying conditions, 
behaviours, individuals, beliefs, and institutions, that existed beforehand by overstating 
the disruptive power of the colonial state. Like the British-led reforms of the 1920s, the 
Iranian revolution and the Iraq Invasion of 2003 have been recently argued to be a 
turning point in the emergence of sectarian political mobilization in Bahrain, reflecting 
not only a simplified notion of transnational identity politics, but also an objectification 
of the Shi‘i population as a passive subject, dependent mostly on the whim of 
ideological pulls, administrative reform and colonial intervention. Just as such sectarian 
approaches run the risk of essentialising Shi‘a as passive automatons, so too does it 
paint Sunnis as unyielding and subject to an instinctive fear of the prospect of a Shi‘a 
crescent.47  
 
 
The persecution of the Baḥārna and the Shi‘a  
 
Rather than seeing a turning-point narrative as the key causal agent, it is important to 
examine long-standing processes of persecution in order to get a sense of how injustice 
has been key in provoking demands for political change. In 1984, Ilsa Amelia 
Schumacher’s ethnography conceptualised a ‘traditional Sunni’ perspective of the 
Baḥārna Shi‘a as dirty, revolutionary, uncivilised, animalistic and inbred48. Schumacher 
goes as far as to argue that even certain historic ‘privileges’, such as the government’s 
permission of Ashura rituals, are a means of maintaining a Sunni Shi‘a division by 
‘morally demolishing’ the Shi’a in Sunni eyes. In this, the Bahraini represents the urban, 
civilised Sunni, while the Baḥārna is the Shi‘i antithesis. A similar discourse analysis I 
conducted in 2010 suggested findings similar to Schumacher’s, noting how in the 
contemporary regional context, Shi‘a were often derided as ‘being terrorists, 
uneducated, apostate, traitorous, sexually promiscuous, untrustworthy, violent, deviant, 
backwards, Iranian, Jewish or Rafadites’.49 Schumacher’s study, which took place 
during and immediately after the Iranian Revolution, reflects not simply a post-
Revolutionary reaction against the Shi‘a. On the contrary, the attitudes mentioned 
appear to have deeper roots. In fact, sectarian tensions had not only been evident 
throughout the 20th century, but Shi‘a had long been viewed with suspicion prior to the 
1979 Revolution.  
While we must be wary of clear-cut ruptures, periodisation, causal shifts, and 
even path dependencies, the arrival of the Al Khalifa in the 1780s, and whatever their 
‘gaze’ (to use the post-colonial term) might be, was key in altering the existing modes of 
production vis-à-vis the indigenous Baḥārna and ruling family. The feudal system 
established by the Al Khalifa was one of economic exploitation that frequently resulted 
in violence. Indeed, this tribal overrule was differentiated from Bahrain’s many previous 
occupiers by the appropriation of ‘every resource’.50 Crucially, as Jiwon Choi has 
convincingly argued51, this was a settler-colonial relationship, one in which the Baḥārna 
experienced the ‘confiscation’ of lands52 and other forms of discrimination. Certainly, at 
this time, it was not the ideological currents from outside that determined the attitudes 
of the Baḥārna to the government, but rather their treatment by the internal powers, 
which also occurred along sectarian lines. For example, in court, two Shi‘i witnesses 
equalled one Sunni witness.[rp1]53 The Shi‘a also faced multiple taxes, which included a 
Muharram tax and a Shi‘a tax. In the 1850s, the British often noted but ignored this 
persecution. Captain Taylor observed of the Baḥārna under the Al Khalifa that, 'The 
aboriginal inhabitants of Bahrein, now subjected to a foreign power, suffer from the 
tyranny of their masters more keenly than language can express'.54 There were frequent 
reports of collective punishment in the early 1900s. Sometimes whole villages were 
burnt to the ground, or ransacked by members of the Al Khalifa family or their tribal 
allies, such as the Dawasir. These raids often resulted in numerous deaths. Certain 
members of the ruling family, such as Abdullah bin Isa Al Khalifa, the Ruler’s brother, 
were singled out by the Baḥārna to the Political Agent for engaging in numerous acts of 
rape, extortion and kidnap.55 In 1921 a petition by a large deputation of Bahraini 
subjects noted that the ‘Shi’ah [sic] community [was] in a state of great humiliation and 
subject to public massacre’56 by the ruling family and their tribal allies. It was this 
brutality and oppression that frequently mobilised the Baḥārna. For example, in 1922, 
around 1500 Baḥārna camped around the British agency flagstaff for protection over 
several evenings.   According to Michael Herb, it was the abuses endemic in the feudal 
system that ‘laid the foundations for the sectarian divide that dominates Bahraini 
politics today’.57 
As part of the British reforms, numerous changes were made to limit the 
‘oppression’ of Baḥārna subjects. This fundamentally altered the relationship of the 
British with both the Al Khalifa and the Baḥārna. In exchange for compliance with the 
law, and to prevent tribes from attacking the Baḥārna, and European traders, the British-
appointed Shaykh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to hold the purse strings, and cut off 
members of the family who disobeyed him. New courts were also created, in part to 
prevent a ‘grave injustice’ being done to Shi‘a in Sunni courts. The British also deported 
the Dawasir Tribe to the Arabian mainland, as they were often implicated in the 
oppression and overawing of the Baḥārna. The reforms, however, represented an 
awkward mixture of British reluctance to intervene too much in internal governance, but 
also a vested interest in facilitating their own capital-orientated and empire-building 
priorities. The impact of reforms was neither absolute nor immediate, with members of 
the ruling family threatening collective punishment to Baḥārna villages as late as the 
1930s. Yet it is important not to portray Al Khalifa acquiescence or colonial overrule as 
totalising. Even after the reforms, many Baḥārna were still paying taxes at the whim of 
certain members of the ruling family. In a communique sent in 1929, the British 
administrator Prior noted that Hamad, the then ruler, ‘despised’ the Baḥārna58, while in 
1932 Belgrave stated that ruling family were flexible regarding land reform, ‘except that 
the Baḥārna should acquire any rights to land’59. The general ruling family’s continued 
hostility to the Baḥārna was also embodied in the denigration of the Shia for those 
members of the family seeking to break the sectarian divide. When a member of Al 
Khalifa family ‘converted’ to Shi’a Islam, members of the Al Khfalia family reportedly 
took to the markets to ridicule him, an act that resulted in increased communal tensions.  
Although the wide scale abuses faced by the Baḥārna in the 1800s and early 
1900s were not replicated[rp2] as they had been, communal strife enflamed periodically.  
The British reluctance and even inability to tackle this discrimination was evident as 
late as the 1950s, when they were still attempting to cover up tribal oppression that 
provoked communal tensions. Tensions erupted again in 1953-54, when a ‘handful of 
Sunni agitators, including at least one member of the Al Khalifa ruling family, insulted 
the annual Ashura procession that the Shi‘a organize to commemorate the martyrdom of 
Imam Hussein. Other incidents followed: a Sunni crowd attacked a Bahraini village and 
rioting between Sunni and Bahraini workers occurred in BAPCO’.60 According to 
Charles Belgrave, in 1954, the son of the ruler was driving around with armed retainers 
attacking Baḥārna villagers. This son, Mohammad bin Salman Al Khalifa, later became 
chief of Bahrain Police and Public Security during the 1960s (itself an alarming 
development). Violence, which resulted in numerous deaths in 1954, 1956, and 1965, 
was often, according to Belgrave, exacerbated by institutional prejudice. This was 
epitomised in 1953, when Belgrave noted, 'one of the policemen referred to the Shi‘a as 
“the enemy” & that is the way they regard it'.61 Yet Belgrave’s observation masked the 
fact that the recruitment into the police was largely governed by the British, and in part 
it was their own colonial conceptions of race and character that prevented them from, 
for example, recruiting Baḥārna.62 This maintenance of communal tensions was also 
aggravated for the sake of political expedience. For example, when the Committee of 
National Union (CNU) [rp3]was mobilising Bahrainis to support various reforms, the 
British actively sought to exploit political divisions by reminding the Shi‘a community 
of how the British had defended their interests, and that it would not be in their interests 
to join the agitation. 
Leading up to Bahrain’s Independence in 1971, tensions emerged in particular 
over the treatment of both Bahraini Shi‘a and Iranians living in Bahrain, reflecting 
underlying currents of division.  In the 1960s, Iranian claims to Bahrain contributed to 
tensions by some against the Bahraini Iranian community. A demonstration broke out in 
1968 in which a group of around two thousand people denounced the Iranian claim. 
Some scuffles reportedly broke out between Iranians and Arabs. In a small counter-
protest, a group of Iranians held up pictures of the Shah. It was for this reason that the 
Bahraini authorities began deporting Iranians living in Bahrain. The British 
administration, already preparing for their own departure, advised the ruling family 
against deporting Iranians, as they had ‘no intention of persecuting the Iranian 
community’. Yet the process continued. All foreigners were summoned to courts to have 
their residency visas renewed. Unsurprisingly, many Iranians refused to even show up.  
The British claimed that Jordanian judges working in Bahrain, in a wish to demonstrate 
their Arabness, did not renew Iranian permits.   
Sectarian divisions were once again evident as the Bahraini government 
prepared for the departure of their British protectors, by creating the National Guard in 
1968 (which later became the Bahrain Defence Force [BDF]). In addition to the 
aforementioned government hostility towards Iranians in Bahrain, discussions about the 
makeup of the armed forces took sectarian composition into consideration. Anthony 
Parsons, the British Political Agent in Bahrain between 1965 and 1969, noted that the 
recruitment of the Shi‘a in the BDF was to be capped at 25%.63  This perhaps goes 
against Louer’s notion that it was after the Iranian Revolution that ‘the threat perception 
of the regime underwent a deep transformation’, 64 adding that: ‘With the all-out use of 
the Shi‘a religious identity for protesting against the regime, the Bahraini rulers began 
to embrace a sectarian definition of concepts of loyalty and disloyalty, being tempted to 
see any Shi‘a as a potential threat’.65 While Louer examines and notes the rise of Shi‘a 
movements in Bahrain in the late 1960s and 70s66, the idea that regime’s threat 
perception deeply transforming as a result of the Iranian Revolution is perhaps an 
overstatement. Concepts of loyalty and disloyalty had been extant long before the 
Iranian Revolution.  
 
 
Resurgent modalities of repression and their causes: From 
independence to the Iranian Revolution  
 
Given the apparent embedding of the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest and the relatively 
short time since the reforms of the 1920s, there is little substantial evidence to suggest 
that prejudicial attitudes have not died out in the contemporary period, or failed to 
inform policy. To a certain extent, elements of contentious politics in Bahrain can partly 
be ascribed to a bifurcation of control strategies formulated by a dialectic between two 
powers with immediate hegemony in the geographic locale: Britain and the ruling tribal 
Al Khalifa family. This dialectic shifted with increasing British encroachment in 
Bahrain’s internal affairs, and impacted upon the modality of repression. The resultant 
compromise, or ‘friendship’ as the British and Bahraini governments call it, was the 
ossification of Al Khalifa rule through British protection and legitimization, the legal 
formalisation (in a European sense) of Al Khalifa settler colonialism, but also the 
temporary hiatus of a specific modality of repression, which had hitherto been their 
unlimited feudal rights over the local Baḥārna population.67 Sectarian tensions did not 
disappear following the reforms of the 1920s, but its manifestation altered significantly 
with the disruption of feudal rule, becoming perhaps less visible, less arbitrary, and less 
overly acceptable as a means of economic subjugation and control. However, the 
fundamental power base did not change significantly. While repression occurred before 
and after independence, all repressions are not equal. Just as Davenport argues that 
differently types of authoritarian regimes repress differently, modalities of repression 
change depending on a number of things, including; governance, threat, external factors, 
ideologies of elites, etc.68  Given the shift in modalities of repression during the British 
protection of the Al Khalifa, the British departure in 1971 provides an interesting 
juncture for the analysis of post-Independence contentious politics. Similarly, the 
change in control of the security forces is an important object of examination, for they 
are an important body whose capacity for violence has long defined communal 
differences.69 In this regard, rather than emphasising the Iranian revolution as the main 
driver in changes in the nature of the treatment [rp4]of political opposition, one must also 
consider the changing power structures and institutions as causal agents in this change.  
 
Calling the shots: The repressive apparatus  
While one of the key British reforms of the 1920s had been the creation of a police 
force and the regulation of violence, even prior to Independence, the ruling family 
increasingly defined much of the security policy. This significantly altered notions of 
threat perception and how to deal with dissent. After Independence, cables from both 
the Foreign Office and US State Department acknowledged the declining influence of 
the British head of police, Jim Bell, and the British head of special Branch, Ian 
Henderson. In the early 1970s,70 both were 'excluded from various private lines of 
command influence'.71 Furthermore, Henderson was ‘no longer allowed to detain or 
interrogate’ detainees as he saw fit. 72 In 1973, it was reported that the Prime Minister 
had the last word on matters of internal security and basic foreign policy'73 and kept 
police and special branch 'closely under his own control'.74 By 1975 the Prime Minister 
reportedly had ' his own way on security matters which were his sole responsibility'.75 If 
true, this reflected a shift in power at the Ministry of Interior –towards the Prime 
Minister, Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, and a merchant elite, who Harold 
Walker said included the al-Moyad and al-Zayani families.  This hard-line relationship 
was highlighted as early as 1974, with the British reporting that 'the government and the 
merchant class thought it was time to take a firm hand'76 against any unrest. It was in 
this context that general treatment of the opposition changed. Under the Prime 
Minister’s oversight the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf 
(PFLOAG) was dismantled.77 In 1974 the Prime Minister almost doubled the security 
budget as insurance against potential legalisation of non-political trade unions, again, 
reflecting a broader shift in the nature of threat perception and hard-line attitudes 
towards organized opposition.78 Despite the presence of the US base, the post-
Independence protection vacuum was filled by the ever-increasing influence of Saudi 
Arabian authoritarianism, which one official described as ‘too Islamic’ and ‘too close 
for comfort’79. As early as 1972, the British noted that in many ways, the Saudis were 
more of a worry than Iran, due to their influence and conservatism.80 Prior to 
Independence, the prospect of having Bedouin in the security forces was shot down by 
the British administration, who were advising on the creation of the new army.  Yet by 
1982, the recruitment of 300 ‘kindred tribesmen’ from Saudi into the security forces 
raised issues of whether they would impact upon institutional prejudice81. It appeared 
Saudi’s influence was especially evident in the Prime Minister, who was reportedly 
unwilling to defy King Faisal82. So, in addition to the internal reversion back to Al 
Khalifa dominance in internal security policy, the previously dominant British- Al 
Khalifa dialectic that informed approaches to security was now being usurped to some 
extent by a ‘conservative Sa’udi-Al Khalifa nexus’83. Yet while much discussion has 
focused on Iranian-subversion as a catalyst for changing threat perceptions, or Shi‘a 
susceptibility to ideological control, little is made of Bahrain’s actual alliance with 
Saudi Arabia.  
Independence, and the changing dialectic of external overrule, reorientated the 
modalities of repression against the opposition in general[rp5]. This was especially 
evident in the treatment of the Shi‘a and Baḥārna. For example, while the government 
had predicted a peaceful Ashura in 1980, the Prime Minister said that firm action would 
have to be taken once Ashura was out of the way. When asked why, the Prime Minister 
reportedly stated to Ian Henderson that he wished to demonstrate that the ‘Bahrain 
Government were true Arabs’84. The meaning of this comment is not clear, yet Geoffrey 
Arthur, after meeting with members of the Al Khalifa, stated that the Arab/Persian 
rivalry was perhaps more significant in formulating opinion of the Shi‘a in Bahrain, 
noting that the ‘Bahraini ruling family were far less worried by the direct influence 
which Khomeini and the Iranian evolution might have on the Shi‘i majority in Bahrain 
than by the risk of the installation of a Shi‘i government in Baghdad’. Despite the 
peaceful passing of ‘Ashura, the Prime Minister took this ‘firm action’, ordering the 
arrest of 650 ‘Shi’a’85. This was in addition to the 200 Shi‘a who had been arrested 
beforehand.86 The fact that Ashura had passed peacefully reportedly ‘encouraged’ the 
Prime Minister to order widespread arrest of Shi‘a. While Ian Henderson has been 
accused of personally engaging in torture by some Bahrainis, communication with the 
British Embassy in Bahrain show that he actually disagreed on a policy level with the 
decision to order this crackdown, advising ‘the Bahrainis strongly against this course of 
action, saying that it was likely to lead to more Shi‘i ‘martyrs’ and would probably have 
the opposite effect from that desired’.87 Henderson complained about a similar issue in 
1982, objecting to the fact that the Prime Minister and King were illegally deporting 
Bahraini nationals to Iran,88 which had also happened in the late sixties. Specifically, 
Henderson feared that this would exacerbate the security situation in Bahrain by 
furnishing the ranks of subversives training abroad. While these fears resembled those 
iterated by British officials in 1968, the deportations in 1982 were actually of Bahrainis 
and not Iranians living in Bahrain, reflecting not simply a resurgence of sectarian 
animosity, but, in line with the Prime Minister’s aforementioned comments, an 
Arabisation of Gulfness (as opposed to a Gulfisation of Arabness).   
It is interesting, and rare, to have such an opportunity to compare different 
responses to a perceived security threat. The Prime Minister’s decision, likely taken 
with advice from the new conservative core, were based on an entirely different 
approach to repression, one that is unlikely to be devoid of specific prejudices, interest 
protection, or the trappings of the ‘legacy of conquest’. The disagreement of the Prime 
Minister with Ian Henderson symbolises a friction not necessarily in the objective threat 
posed by Iran, put perhaps in the ‘ideological constraints on the modalities of 
repression’,89 which influence the attitude towards what repressive action to take, itself 
a notoriously underexplored aspect of repression literature. Such a question should also 
raise interesting questions about the nature of the ‘authoritarian reflex’, loosely defined 
‘by a relative lack of inhibition or restraint on the use of power’90. It can hardly be said 
to be black and white, but one of degree, where ‘lack of inhibition’ in the use of power 
is highly dependent on the beliefs of those responsible for its deployment, as well as 
other contextual considerations. It would be difficult to argue that the increasing 
brutality of the police, which had its inception long before the Iranian Revolution, was 
not contributing to rising tensions, and indicative of not simply a shifting ‘threat 
perception’, but a differing authoritarian reflex, and a reciprocity between repression 
and dissent. Similarly, while Gause argues that countries like Bahrain had successfully 
staved off revolution by modernising, it would seem that a Shi‘a insurrection did not 
occur despite repression, and that in many cases, policies were undertaken that could 
actually exacerbate hostility to the regime. Indeed, while the Prime Minister’s actions 
occurred in the aftermath of the Revolution, they were not undertaken on the grounds 
that those arrested or deported were posing a clear security threat. They were taken with 
the warning that they would exacerbate any hostility towards the regime.  
 
Dissolving the National Assembly 
 In addition to the role played by the security services, Bahrain's brief democratic 
experiment between 1973 and 1975 had also contributed to strengthening a unified 
opposition, reflecting a resurgence of what might be termed deliberately divisive 
politics91. Whereas the government had hoped that the so-called ‘people’s bloc’92 and 
‘religious bloc’ would always be at loggerheads, their joint opposition to the 
government-proposed Security Law created an alliance.93 This unity had alarmed the 
regime and contributed to them dissolving parliament, for fear that legal unity of 
opposition could transcend the oppositional fragmentation that the Al Khalifa regime 
had used to keep the opposition divided and weak. For this reason, the government tried 
to drive a wedge between the leftists and religious elements, isolating them. As such, the 
period following 1975 was important, as it marked a ‘reconfiguration of the Bahraini 
opposition landscape’.94 Only a year after the creation of parliament, the British official 
Robert Tesh noted that the 'rulers are deliberately encouraging the Right (particularly 
the Religious group) to react against the Left'95. One minister insisted that the left were 
being successfully smeared as communists and were becoming generally unpopular. As 
occurred with the Shi‘a being painted as an exogenous fifth column, the regime also 
‘deliberately exaggerated’ the extent to which leftist groups were taking orders from 
outside the country.96 Tesh noted that a '“divide and rule” policy does, however, have its 
dangers and creates the possibility of violence'.97   
The rift between the left and conservative elements was further driven home in 
1976 with the high profile murder of Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Madani, a Shi‘a religious 
scholar and editor of the local newspaper Al-Mawaqif. Maintained by many Bahrainis as 
a government conspiracy, his murder resulted in a further shift in the modalities of 
repression, and a different approach to interrogation and torture.98 The murder, after 
which there was a summary political trial, was used by the Bahraini authorities to justify 
a crackdown on leftist political groups in Bahrain, and resulted in a policy that had 
previously prevented targets of subversion from being arrested, and therefore tortured. 
As Given[rp6] noted, 'the 'murder removed the restriction on the interrogation of Popular 
Front suspects, and enabled the police to acquire a clearer picture than before of its 
ramifications and activities'.99 Prior to this, 'the absence of interrogation of suspects 
meant that the police received only the amount of intelligence which their sources in the 
NLF cared to give them'. 100 The policy seemed to immediately follow the death of two 
Bahrainis, Muhammad Ghulum Busheri and Saʿid al-ʿUwaynati, who were killed under 
torture following their arrest.  Although the trial was highly politicised, and the evidence 
shaky, the ruling family used it as an opportunity to concentrate in their hands both 
politically sensitive posts and those relating to social affairs.101 Saudi pressure was 
strongly evident in the trial, and they, along with the Prime Minister, were pushing 
strongly for death penalties, which were successfully carried out in 1977102. With the 
wholescale crackdown on the leftist movement, and their perceived role as being 
involved in anti- Shi‘a attacks, it was much easier for an Islamist opposition to appear 
dominant. In this regard, the threat of popular politics in infringing on increasingly 
limited Al Khalifa resources prompted an aggressive strategy of stonewalling 
participatory politics.  While the suspension of parliament and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s criticism of Gulf rulers may have been amplified by the suspensions of 
parliament103, the revolution undoubtedly resonated more broadly due to dashed hopes, 
growing corruption, torture, police repression, and a firm line towards political 
opposition. Yet this talk of amplification [rp7]negates the issue of whether or not 
elements of Ruling Family/Saudi conservatism played out in terms of the [rp8]Bahraini 
authorities’ response to both political opposition and the country’s Shi‘a population. 
Indeed, it would seem that the shift in modalities of repression, especially in the 
treatment of the Shi‘a, do not simply reflect a rational security strategy. Such a strategy 
would fit in with Fuad Khuri’s argument that the regime had always preferred Islamist 
opposition as it was easier for them to control traditional terms.104  Even without 
parliament, the fear that a cross-identity opposition could transcend organizational 
fragmentation to unite a previously disparate opposition against the tribal governance of 
the Al Khalifa was very real. Certainly, the destruction of a once active leftist 
community would have made more visible the religious opposition. This certainly casts 
doubt on Louay Bahry’s argument that the Iranian Revolution was the cause for the 
decline of alternative opposition, as if its ubiquitous influence was entirely attributable 
to its own resonance with the country’s Shi‘a. Bahry notes that, ‘Until the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran, this secular opposition led the drive for political reforms in Bahrain, 
but the success of the Iranian revolution introduced an entirely new concept into 
opposition dynamics in Bahrain--the use of religious symbols as a political tool’105.  It 
would be logically problematic to argue that the leftist opposition were simply usurped 
by the popularity of Iranian-trained clerics who only after the Revolution used the pulpit 
to put forward progressive issues such as constitutional reform and human rights106.  
 
Actual and anticipated economic fallout.  
In addition to shifting changes in the authority structures in Bahrain, and a less tolerant 
approach towards opposition, economic factors were among those contributing to unrest 
in the country. While Gause argues that the failure of the Iranian Revolution to trigger 
an uprising in Bahrain rested on the capacity of the state to provide services for citizens 
may be somewhat economically deterministic, Frederic Wherey adds that on the eve of 
the Revolution across the Gulf, the ‘Shiʿa were faced with a combustible blend of rising 
expectations, poor living conditions, and limited avenues for political participation’.107   
Add to this rising corruption and cronyism, which was actually becoming an 
increasingly large problem. The wealth that accrued to the [rp9]ruling family through oil 
royalties was now being used to exploit the real estate market, increasing the gap 
between haves and have-nots108 while  underscoring disgruntlement, corruption and 
wealth appropriation. It is also possible that the 1971 limitation of oil revenue 
payments109 to the Amir led to an increasing demand for members of the Al Khalifa to 
secure other means of income now that the civil list had diminished. This too could 
explain why the ruling family were reportedly ‘squeezing out established merchants’ 
and moving into other areas of business,110 while also 'closing ranks'.111   Naturally this 
affected the poorest section of society, the Baḥārna Shi‘a, who had largely been, as 
mentioned previously, deliberately excluded from the privilege of ownership and 
inherited land rights. The Baḥārna suffered most from rising inequality, a fact that 
Fuccaro notes has shaped the urban topography of Bahrain, creating satellite villages in 
which marginality and militancy flourished112. Yet while Fuccaro argues that this 
militancy gathered momentum after the Iranian Revolution, Schumacher’s ethnography 
in the 1980s highlights that while many Bahrainis supported radical political change, it 
was not because ‘Khumayni [sic] was their avowed spiritual leader, but because they 
see the Al Khalifa as unfairly siphoning off the country’s wealth for personal 
advantage’. 113 It is this unfairness, Lawson also argues, that provided the impetus for 
the 1990s Intifada114. The economic stagnation that began to set in during the latter half 
of the 1980s also led to fear that Bahrain's Shiʿa, who represented the country's working 
class, would become increasingly restive.  This growing Baḥārna-working class threat 
intersected, and was thus perceived as a potential time bomb, regardless of the Iranian 
Revolution. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Numerous scholars have argued that the Iranian Revolution was a major distal shift in 
Bahrain’s politics, especially with regards to the role of religion in society. This 
emphasis has detracted from other explanations that suggest more complex variables for 
the treatment of the population. By revisiting both this period and the decades preceding 
the Revolution, as well as by looking beyond economic determinism, it becomes clear 
that the[rp10] persecution of the Shi‘a in the 1970s and 1980s was the result of  the 
convergence of numerous factors that had been incubated over several decades of 
British overrule, and catalysed by Bahrain's Independence in 1971. Of course, these 
variables include the Iranian Revolution to some extent, yet this emphasis perhaps 
obscures other important factors in the mix.  Indeed, shifts in the power-dialectic, long-
term marginalisation of the Shiʿa, the creation of a Shiʿa working class, economic fears, 
the rising influence of Saudi, the increase in operational control by the ruling family, 
and the less constrained articulation of Al Khalifa ethnocentrism all seem to underline 
an explanation for increased repression of the Shiʿa and opposition in general[rp11]. The 
focus on the Islamic Revolution seems to have produced an agenda-setting fulcrum in 
the historiography of Bahrain, one in which current contextualisations of the Shiʿa 
threat obtain purchase, leverage, and credibility. This is dangerous as it may, in some 
policy circles, evoke sympathy for a discriminatory political system on the basis that the 
Government of Bahrain are merely countering an exogenous threat. It would be more 
accurate, in my opinion, to argue that since independence there has been a reassertion of 
the Al Khalifa legacy of conquest, wherein the country's Shi‘a, and in particular the 
Baḥārna population, have been treated with increasing contempt. Indeed, it was 
independence that caused a re-assertion of Al Khalifa dominance in matters of internal 
security, which in turn impacted upon how the security forces dealt with any perceived 
threat, whether leftist, religious, or otherwise. Prior to this, the British had, to some 
extent, altered the modalities of Al Khalifa repression towards the indigenous Baḥārna 
and Shi‘a population. Yet now it seems, as Abulhadi Khalaf argues, that the ruling 
family are continuing on the path of Ahmed the Conqueror, [rp12]appropriating land and 
engaging in plunder while diverting responsibility onto exogenous factors115.  
 So while the resonance of the Iranian Revolution is important, emphasising it as 
the causal agent in the rise of sectarian hostility validates the structures of power that 
perpetuate an existing conquerer-subject relationship in Bahrain, drawing on notions of 
prejudice in which Shi‘a are seen as innately revolutionary and deviant.  Indeed, the 
combination of the rhetoric of the Shi‘a as an underclass in Bahrain, coupled with their 
historic discrimination, raises the issue of whether or not it is logically defensible to 
focus on the Iranian Revolution as a motivator of unrest. While is understandable that 
the Revolution [rp13]has attracted much attention, as it revised the US and European 
foreign policy to Iran, this transnationally deterministic paradigm has facilitated 
uncritical analyses seen through the prism of Atlantic-centric security concerns. 
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